Curtis Gans

Regular readers know that Curtis Gans is both a highly respected expert on voter turnout, and something of a crank when it comes to the youth vote. This week, Gans released his report on 2008 voter turnout, and, given his history, I was pleasantly surprised to see him giving young voters some props in contributing to Obama's win.

An analysis of exit polls by Peter Levine and his colleagues at Tufts University, showed that youth turnout (18- 24) increased by one percentage point over 2004 and that both voting and activism was largely by the college educated and resident. This was the same group which, with strong anti-Bush and anti-Iraq war views, participated at a high rate in 2004 and drove overall youth turnout to within three percentage points of the post-18-20 enfranchisement high of 49.6 percent of eligibles voting in 1972. It is likely that the 2004 gain will mean that youth turnout was much closer to the 1972 high in reported turnout when the Census Bureau survey on reported voting is released.

But the more important contribution of the college-educated young was in providing the sinew for Obama’s extensive grassroots organization which was, in part, responsible for the large increase in Democratic turnout.

Nevertheless, something would be horribly amiss if Gans and I didn't disagree at least a little bit. And I can't agree with what he says here (emphasis mine):

This election and the election of 2004 provided a lesson about mobilization. In the 2004 election there was a large gap in President Bush’s favor with respect to positive feelings about the candidates. Most Republicans were voting affirmatively for Bush, while the primary motivation for nearly a majority of Democratic voters was not pro-Kerry, but anti-Bush. The situation was precisely the opposite in 2008, with substantially more Democratic voters expressing affirmative views about Obama than Republican voters about McCain.

In 2004 both parties had strong voter identification and get-out-the-vote efforts, but the GOP was able to draw substantially more voters to vote early and on Election Day. The opposite was true in 2008.

Which suggests that mobilization efforts—no matter how sophisticated they are and how comprehensive their reach—are as successful as the ground they till in terms of affirmative voter sentiment.

Maybe for the overall electorate that is true. After all, older voters are fairly set in their partisanship and voting habits. They need to be persuaded to change either - an expensive and difficult thing to accomplish. But with regards to the youth vote, I'm not sure that Gans's logic holds up. That' important because these paragraphs immediately follow the ones where he lauds the contributions of young voters, leaving the impression that youth turnout and mobilization is all about the candidate's popularity.

But as Gans himself knows, youth turnout increased substantially in 2004, despite the lack of "affirmative voter sentiment." I'll reiterate the message of my favorite political website in 2004, which I find to be a good summary of young people's attitudes during that campaign: "John Kerry is a douchebag but I'm voting for him anyway." In the face of that mantra, Gans' argument has no explanation for higher youth turnout, and he quite skillfully words his report so as to avoid the conversation. That's sort of his M.O.

The real lessons of 2004 and 2008 are that young voters will participate if you ask them to. And unlike older voters, their partisanship and voting habits are malleable. They don't need to be persuaded, they just need to be engaged and contacted. In 2004, independent organizations made that ask and youth turnout rose substantially. In 2008, both independent organizations and the Obama campaign made that ask, which was then echoed throughout our media. The result? Youth turnout reached the second highest level recorded since 18 - 20 year-olds received the right to vote.

It's also worth noting that Gans is defining youth as 18 - 24 year olds, despite the fact that CIRLCE, which he quotes, and pretty much every single organization dedicated to engaging young voters defines them as 18 - 29.

This is a guest post by Morley Winograd and Michael Hais, the authors of Millennial Makeover. --Mike

As admirers of Curtis Gans' research on voter turnout, it pained us to read his Baby Boomer-oriented screed attacking the Millennial Generation, even denying the existence of the Millennials, for not acting exactly like the Boomers did when they were young. Aging Boomers like Tom Friedman have made the same public mistake, demonstrating just how convinced many leading thinkers among the Boomer Generation are that the political style of young people today is not like their own youthful political behavior was and is, therefore, not appropriate or useful. While it would be easy to address this error by simply commenting admiringly on Mike Connery’s excellent blog dissecting Gans' diatribe, the egregious nature of Gans' comments warrants a more fulsome response.

Since Gans' research report was focused on, in his words, the increased, “almost record,” turnout in this year’s presidential primaries, it is particularly surprising that he chose this vehicle to announce his distaste for the Millennial Generation and its political style. Gans cites the work of William Damon as the source of his knowledge about this generation, which is strange given the large number of more well-documented studies of the Millennial Generation disproving Damon’s contention that the parents of Millennials are “creating a generation of young people who lack confidence and direction.” The evidence shows just the opposite. If anything, employers and teachers who interact daily with Millennials complain that they are almost too confident, to the point of sounding “cheeky.”

This generation's self-confidence and orientation toward the group and the broader society has important political implications. Recent polling data from USAToday/CNN demonstrate that Millennials are paying close attention to the 2008 election and have every intention of voting, at numbers rivaling those of older voters. Their survey of more than 900 young Americans, taken Sept. 18-28 found that:

• 75 % of Millennials are registered to vote
• 73% plan to vote
• 64% have given "quite a lot" of thought to the election

Even Gans concedes that Millennials may vote in large numbers in this election. But he says that they will do so only because of their fondness for Senator Barack Obama and not because of any long-term commitment to the political process. Millennials he says

“were brought in by the uniqueness of Obama’s candidacy—precisely because he seemed to offer something different than the politics they had been eschewing.” He continues, “they won’t stay in if he’s not elected and their interest and engagement won’t be sustained if he does not live up to the promise of his candidacy once in office.”

Gans makes this assertion in spite of having no data to support it.

There is no doubt that Millennials have responded very positively to Senator Obama and his candidacy and that the Obama campaign has strongly targeted this generation. Millennials supported Obama overwhelmingly in this year's Democratic primaries and virtually all current general election surveys indicate that Millennials favor him over John McCain by at least a 2:1 margin.

But the political attitudes and identifications of Millennials were clearly evident long before the Obama candidacy gained widespread visibility. A Pew Research Center survey conducted in March 2007 indicated that Millennials identified as Democrats over Republicans by nearly a 2:1 ratio (52% vs. 30%). And, a study conducted at about the same time by the Millennial Strategy Program of communication research and consultation firm Frank N. Magid Associates showed that Millennials were the first generation since at least the GI Generation to contain a greater number of self-perceived liberals than conservatives. All of this at least raises the possibility that the high level of Millennial political involvement is significantly based on the Democratic and liberal affinities of the generation and would be strong even without Obama's strong candidacy.

Gans makes it clear why he is sure that the political involvement of Millennials stems solely from their attachment to Barack Obama. He yearns for the “idealistic activism” of the 1950s and 1960s when, according to Gans, all of America shared a “different ethos” thanks to an educational system based “on John Dewey’s philosophy.” Since, in Gans' mind, the emerging Millennial Generation doesn’t share the liberal idealism of his own youth, it cannot possibly sustain its current level of political activity. If only it were so, Curtis.

In fact, the ideological ferment of the late 1960s, led by half of the Baby Boomer Generation’s counter-cultural rebellion against authority, and the reaction against this social turmoil by the other half of Boomer Generation, produced the political gridlock that caused the very cynicism in the older portions of the electorate that Gans decries. Even his own expert on the Millennial Generation, William Damon, concedes that Millennials “are working hard, doing well enough in school, and staying out of trouble.” Indeed, America is enjoying far lower levels of socially deviant behavior, such as teen age pregnancy and crime, since these indicators began to soar during the adolescent years the Baby Boomer Generation with its disdain for social rules and convention.

But Gans' own words demonstrate the flaw in his thinking. The 1950s that he writes about so nostalgically was actually an era dominated by the behavior and ethos of the GI Generation, another “civic” generational archetype, just like Millennials, not by his beloved Boomers. That generation put FDR in the White House, brought about the New Deal approach to progressive government, defeated fascism in WWII, and voted at rates greater than those of previous generations. Their Democratic loyalty lasted a lifetime: the last remaining members of the GI Generation and the first sliver of Millennials provided the only pluralities for John Kerry over George W. Bush among any of the generational cohorts voting in 2004.

The previous falloff in voting by young people described by Gans in his diatribe is completely explained by the generational attitudes and behaviors of Boomers and Gen-Xers as they moved into and out of young adulthood. One generation, Boomers, initially turned out to vote spurred by admirable idealism and then often left the political process when they discovered in Gans’ telling phrase, that “their leaders showed feet of clay.” The other, Generation X, never bothered to participate in large numbers having been discouraged by the political gridlock Boomers had created. Now that Millennials make up the entire population of voters 26 and under in this election, you can be assured that they will not only vote at rates comparable to older voters, just like their GI Generation great-grandparents did, but they will also continue to vote heavily and participate vigorously in the nation’s political process for the rest of their lives.

They will do so, because unlike Curtis Gans and his ilk, who never were able to translate their idealism into action, Millennials are intent on working together to create a better America than the one Boomers have left them as an inheritance. Their confidence, political activism, and unity will begin to initiate that change on Election Day this year thanks to a record turnout of young voters. The 1.7 million vote plurality given to John Kerry by young voters in 2004 will grow to between 8 and 10 million for Barack Obama when this involved and unified generation goes to the polls on November 4. Only Curtis Gans and out of touch Boomers will be surprised.

Yesterday I was quoted in a Politico story about celebrity outreach to young voters. Curtis Gans was also quoted, making much the same argument he did in the report I blogged earlier today (emphasis mine):

But Curtis Gans, director of the Center for the Study of the American Electorate, cautions against concluding that there’s a causal relationship — and against ignoring the influence of the candidates themselves.

“It really depends on the fertility of the field,” Gans said. “The best example is that, in 1992, Rock the Vote claimed credit for a large surge in youth turnout. But using precisely the same methodology in 1996, youth turnout was the lowest ever. ... The same performers that got people to register in 1992 could not get people to register in 1996.”

Gans attributes the turnout spike in the last presidential election cycle to opposition to President Bush, even though it was not enough for John F. Kerry to defeat him.

Here's the problem - they didn't use the same methodology. In 1992, Rock the Vote had a huge field program. It was that field component, combined with the competitive election, the economic crisis, and the novelty of Rock the Vote as an institution that accounted for the large upswing in young voter participation. By 1996, the novelty had worn off and the field program had fallen into shambles. The Rock the Vote of 1996 was mostly a media campaign. It was not the same organization or the exact same methodology as in 1992.

Now, Gans is right that the economic upswing and the lack of a competitive race played a role in driving down youth turnout, but it was not the only factor by any means. The bottom line is this: Gans consistently ignores the role of traditional and non traditional field work aimed at young voters in increasing young voter turnout. It seems to be his blind spot.

Curtis Gans, a respected election expert operating out of American University, has a completely bizarre report out today on the lack of causation or correlation between primary turnout and turnout in the general election. I say bizarre because the report, which contains 4 pages of data, quickly devolves into 6 pages of "commentary" that only tangentially focuses on the relationship between primary and general election turnout. Instead, it reads more like a screed on what Gans thinks is wrong with our country and political system in 2008.

Gans is right when he says that there is no relationship between national primary turnout and national general election turnout. Of course there isn't. There are too many factors - such as how competitive the primary process is that year, whether one or both parties have competitive contests, how long those contests drag on, etc. - that can tip the balance for their to be any direct relationship.

But that's an overly broad question. The more interesting question to ask would have been "is there a direct correlation between primary and GE turnout for specific demographics?" For instance, if young voters turnout in record numbers in a Democratic primary, do we then see record numbers of Democratic youth turning out in the General Election? Or, if evangelical christians vote in record numbers in a Republican primary, do they also vote in record numbers in the General Election? And do those trends repeat throughout history? That would be useful information, and might give us a better idea what to expect in November, but Gans isn't asking those questions.

More important to me at the moment, though, is Gans' attempts to "debunk" the idea that there is a civically engaged demographic called the "Millennial Generation." To the extent that Gans is respected and is often quoted in the media, this deserves a response.

There Is No Millennial Generation: The large-scale involvement of college resident and educated youth is one of the most heartening aspects of this year’s nominating process. But the conclusions some have drawn from that participation—that we have a new politically engaged generation—is simply not supported by the facts.

Those involved this year are a fraction of the youth population and were brought in by the uniqueness of Obama’s candidacy—precisely because he seemed to offer something different than the politics they had been eschewing. They would not have stayed in—at least in anywhere near the numbers which have participated in the primaries—had Obama not won the nomination. They won’t stay in if he’s not elected and their interest and engagement won’t be sustained if he does not live up to the promise of his candidacy once in office.

What Gans ignores here is the fact that increased in youth turnout did not start with Obama, nor are they totally attributable to his candidacy. The youth vote increased significantly in 2004, and again in 2006 (pdfs). In neither case was Barack Obama on the ballot, nor did he have an active campaign operating that might boost turnout. This is not to say that Obama himself, and his candidacy, are not attracting new voters in greater numbers than we might have otherwise seen. But recent trends all suggest that youth participation in the 2008 election would have increased even without Obama's candidacy.

Gans' argument also neglects the fact that increased youth turnout is not a spontaneous event, but rather the result of hard work put out by many thousands of activists engaging in electoral politics, or the "electoral specialists" as the National Conference on Citizenship's 2008 Civic Health Index (pdf) calls them. It is due to the countless hours in the field spent door knocking and peer to peer organizing that was responsible for vote increases among young people in 2004 and 2006, and it is Obama's adoption of those peer to peer tactics that has made his campaign similarly successful among youth not just in polls, but at the voting booth.

Gans, of course, disagrees. He thinks that 2004 and 2006 were a result of anti-Bush sentiment. In the words of the great Jeffrey Lebowski: "That's just like, your opinion, man." Gans has no data to back up that claim, only his gut. But there is plenty of data to show that young voter outreach programs were of great effect at increasing turnout in 2004 and 2006. What's more, with the notable exception of Pennsylvania, every swing state targeted heavily by youth vote organizers in 2004 overperformed the national turnout average for young voters (pdf), climbing as high as 71% in Minnesota and 65% in Wisconsin. How does Gans explain that? Was anti-Bush sentiment greater in these swing states than in other states? Or did the targeted outreach actually have an impact?

Gans does try to answer that question:

The involvement of middle-class educated youth this year is not an isolated phenomenon. There is a reservoir of idealism, hope and a willingness to engage that has been part of every generation. In my lifetime, some of this group were madly for Adlai, others were engaged by the youth and energy of John F. Kennedy, still others formed the foot soldiers of the civil rights and anti-Vietnam war movements and came clean for Gene (McCarthy) in New Hampshire’s primary campaign. They also were, for about eight months, enticed by the policy wonkishness on issues they cared about of Bill Clinton and Al Gore, were taken for about a month or two by the 2000 candidacy of John McCain and the 2004 candidacy of Howard Dean and came out in force in the battleground states against President Bush through the proxy of working for Sen. John Kerry.

So if I read that last bit right, young people aren't involved except when they are, but then it's only because their motives are in the wrong place? That's just rampant speculation and Gans has no data with which to backup his claims

I also disagree with Gans' implication that the kind of engagement we're seeing now is the same as it ever was among "middle class educated youth." While political participation is still not where it should be, young people today are more engaged in many aspects of civic and community life than Gen X and Boomers. As the NCOC Civic Health Index points out, that involvement just takes different forms in response to radically different times. From the NCOC report:

The Millennials so far appear to be considerably more civically engaged than their immediate predecessors, “Generation X.” The voting turnout of young adults (ages 18-29) almost doubled in the 2008 primaries and caucuses compared to the most recent comparable year (2000). There were also substantial youth turnout increases in 2004 and 2006. Youth volunteering rates are higher in the 2000s than they were in the 1990s.

Compared to the Baby Boomers when they were young adults, Millennials are somewhat more likely to volunteer. They are less likely to vote and to participate in face-to-face civil society, as reflected by questions about attending meetings, belonging to groups, and attending religious services. Declines in face-to-face engagement occurred before the widespread use of the Internet; but clearly, today’s youth have new opportunities for online interaction. Overall, if we compare Millennials to previous generations when they were young, the Millennials appear more engaged than Generation X and engaged in different ways from the Boomers.

The NCOC report concedes that Millennials are not as directly involved in politics as they could/should be, and not as engaged in politics as Boomers were when they were young, but the trends are all favorable in this respect, and the report points to the internet as a growing tool through which to bridge the participation gap between "middle class, college educated kids" and non-college, lower income youth.

Ultimately, Gans comes off as nothing more than a crank, pining for the good old days. Is there any other way to read something like this?

The difference between the idealistic activism of the 1950s and 1960s and the activism of the 1980s and later is that the earlier generations were politically involved and interested and stayed in political activity even when their causes did not meet with success or their leaders showed feet of clay. They did so because there was a totally different ethos in America then. Schools were dominated by the ideas of John Dewey who made educated citizens a major educational aim. Parents discussed politics in the home. The media was more concentrated and more purposive. There was much less cynicism. The institutions underlying democracy were strong and well-aligned. People could and did work together across partisan and ideological lines. Great things were accomplished, people felt good about politics and government and wanted to be a part of that enterprise and believed their participation mattered.

Those who were briefly active in the 1980s and later did not stay involved. They didn’t because there is and has been for some time a totally different ethos. Participation in institutions has declined sharply. Media are fragmented and cynical. Politics tends to be a bad word, with most of the young having a dim view of the enterprise. Government is hamstrung by ideological polarization fed by political parties that are misaligned. Schools no longer train for citizenship (although some promote service which is not the same thing and does not have a carry-over effect to politics). Community has been eroded. Negativity in large volume dominates the conduct of politics. Civility is all too often absent. There is simply no grounding for a new engaged generation to emerge.

Yes, Generation X withdrew from politics and community, becoming a highly individualized generation for most of the 80s and 90s. Yes, our political and media system is in sorry shape. But study after study (Generation We, Millennial Makeover, Progressive Politics of the Millennial Generation, Harvard IOP Surveys) all show Millennials to be an optimistic, not cynical, generation. They show Millennials to be believers in community action and their own ability create change. The show Millennials to be believers in the responsibility and potential of government to do good in this country, even if they have little faith in the current actors occupying positions of power. In short, they portray Millennials as a generation with the self confidence, desire and new technologies to reshape the very broken systems Gans identifies.

Against all that, Gans throws out a statistics-free rant about the "good old days" that has but one message: "You kids get off my lawn."